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Bankruptcy Step Zero
Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey†

In RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v Amalgamated Bank,1 the Supreme Court
returned once again to interpreting the absolute priority rule, the foundational
principle of the law of corporate reorganizations. The opinion itself, however,
gives no hint that the Court was revisiting an issue that it has confronted many
times over the last century. Rather than unpacking the contours of absolute
priority, the Court focused on what has emerged as a central theme of the
Court’s recent bankruptcy jurisprudence: the proper domain of the bankruptcy
judge.
One might expect the Court to approach that question of domain as it has for
administrative agencies.2 After all, both bankruptcy courts and administrative
agencies are non‐Article III tribunals.3 But the Court sees them in an altogether
different light. Administrative agencies are entrusted in the first instance with
carrying out federal policies. They are parts of the executive, and a politically
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132 S Ct 2065 (2012).
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The Court’s approach to administrative agencies of course finds it foundation in Chevron

USA v Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837 (1984).
3

Indeed, it has been noted that bankruptcy courts could just as well have been organized as

administrative agencies had history played out differently. See Douglas G. Baird, Blue Collar
Constitutional Law, 86 Am Bankr L J 3, 15 (2012). Others have gone further and suggested that
bankruptcy administration should be transformed today into an executive‐agency model where
law making is done by the agencies charged with administering the bankruptcy law. See, for
example, Rafael Pardo and Kathryn Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy
Administration, 60 UCLA L Rev 384 (2012).
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accountable legislature can delegate matters to them. And the scope of that
delegation is often viewed quite broadly. They enjoy considerable leeway. In
contrast, the Court has confined the space within which the bankruptcy judge
may operate.
Some of the explanation for this contrast lies in the different relationship that
agencies and bankruptcy courts have with Article III courts. Bankruptcy courts
are entirely within the Judiciary. Article III judges themselves appoint
bankruptcy judges. Article III judges can withdraw cases from the bankruptcy
courts, or refuse to refer them to bankruptcy courts in the first instance.
Moreover, every bankruptcy judge’s interpretations of law are reviewed de novo
on appeal in the same fashion as those of any other inferior court. But in addition
to and quite apart from the different structural relationship, the Court’s own
understanding of bankruptcy law itself shapes its view about the powers
entrusted to the bankruptcy judge.
There are three principal strands to the Court’s bankruptcy jurisprudence.
The first, embodied in Butner v United States4 and its progeny, centers on the idea
that the bankruptcy forum must vindicate nonbankruptcy rights. In contrast to
administrative agencies that give shape to federal policies, bankruptcy judges
should not unsettle nonbankruptcy rights—rights that are largely creatures of
state rather than federal law. In the absence of a clear directive from Congress,
those nonbankruptcy rights trump a judge’s impulse to advance federal policy.
The second strand, beginning with Northern Pipeline Construction Co v Marathon
Pipeline Co5 and continuing last Term in Stern v Marshall,6 focuses on the limits of
bankruptcy in a different way. Unlike the public rights at the center of the
administrative state, the traditional state rights at stake in bankruptcy lie at the
heart of the judicial power and cannot be entrusted to non‐Article III courts.
Bankruptcy judges must therefore limit themselves to deciding issues central to
the administration of the bankruptcy process. They cannot issue a final judgment

4

440 US 48 (1979).

5

485 US 50 (1982).

6

131 S CT 2594 (2011).
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with respect to those controversies in bankruptcy that are “the stuff of the
traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster.”7
RadLAX is the latest manifestation of a third strand, one driven in large
measure by the frequent inability of Article III courts to review the decisions of
bankruptcy judges before it is too late to give the losing party an effective
remedy. Even with respect to matters properly entrusted to bankruptcy judges,
RadLAX makes it plain that the Court reads ambiguous provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code in a fashion that narrows the range of decisions over which the
bankruptcy judge may exercise her discretion—at least when the exercise of that
discretion might impact nonbankruptcy rights. Where the statute is ambiguous
and nonbankruptcy rights might be compromised, the preferred reading in those
cases is the one that is more rule‐like. As the Court put it, “The Bankruptcy Code
standardizes an expansive (and sometimes unruly) area of law, and it is our
obligation to interpret the Code clearly and predictably using well established
principles of statutory construction.”8 The Bankruptcy Code should be read
narrowly to ensure that bankruptcy judges stay on a clearly demarcated path.
That view is in stark contrast to the Court’s approach in administrative law.
There the Court observed long ago that Congress has established non‐Article III
tribunals “to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for
dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to
examination and determination by [those] specially assigned to that task.”9 But in
bankruptcy the Court sees flexibility in the Bankruptcy Code as a potential
source of mischief. The need to accommodate practical difficulties works as a
thumb on the scale in assessing the operation of administrative tribunals, yet
such pragmatism is not part of how the Court approaches bankruptcy courts.10
Bankruptcy courts, it seems, need a disciplining hand that ordinary agencies do

7

Id at 2609.

8

RadLAX, 132 S Ct at 2073.

9

Crowell v Benson, 285 US 22, 46 (1932).

10

See Troy A. McKenzie, Getting to the Core of Stern v. Marshall: History, Expertise, and the

Separation of Powers, 86 Am Bankr L J 23, 42 (2012).
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not. This paper attempts to make sense of this state of affairs and proceeds in
three parts.
RadLAX is, in the first instance, a straightforward question of statutory
interpretation, and Part I sets out the statutory provision that RadLAX confronts
and identifies the interpretative challenge it poses. Part II links RadLAX to the
foundational question of the domain of bankruptcy judges, and Part III explores
the consequences that follow from having federal bankruptcy policy vindicated
in a forum so different from those of the administrative state. The conclusion
returns to the puzzle of why the Court perceives the need for oversight so
differently.
I. The “Fair and Equitable” Benchmark
The law of corporate reorganizations has as its central requirement that plans
of reorganization be “fair and equitable.”11 The core substantive meaning of that
phrase has long been settled. The “fair and equitable” requirement imposes a
regime of absolute priority.12 A plan must provide for full payment to the senior
creditors whenever it provides anything to anyone junior.13 The Bankruptcy
Code, however, does not set out clearly the discretion that the bankruptcy court
enjoys in deciding how the senior creditor is protected.
The RadLAX case itself grew out of the financial failure of the Radisson Hotel
at Los Angeles International Airport. The debtor borrowed to renovate the hotel
and build a parking lot next to it. The economic downturn of 2008 unsettled these
plans. The debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition in August 2009, with the parking lot
incomplete and owing its senior lender $120 million. No one believed the
property was worth that much. After extensive marketing, the debtor found a

11

11 USC § 1129(b).
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See Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining after the Fall and the Contours of the

Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U Chi L Rev 738, 744 n 20 (1988).
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Reorganization, 41 U Chi L Rev 651, 654 (1974).
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buyer willing to acquire substantially all of the assets for a much lower amount.
The debtor used this bid as the basis for its plan of reorganization.14
The debtor proposed an open auction. Even though it seemed unlikely
another buyer would appear, others would have a chance to make higher bids.
The senior lender would receive all the proceeds. The junior creditors received
no immediate payment under the plan, but the buyer the debtor found was
willing to fund some distributions to unsecured creditors from the future profits
of the hotel.15 The senior lender could make its own bid, but it would have to bid
in cash just like anyone else.
The debtor argued that this plan was “fair and equitable” and fully respected
the rights of the senior creditor.16 The senior creditor was receiving all the
proceeds of the sale, and the value of an asset is what it yields in a regularly
conducted sale.17 The “fair and equitable” requirement demanded only that the
senior creditor be given the value of its claim. Someone who both receives the
proceeds of an open auction and who participates in the auction on the same
terms as everyone else is necessarily receiving the entire value of her collateral. A
secured creditor does not have the right to dictate the entire course of the
reorganization, even when it is owed more than the firm is worth.

14

RadLAX, 132 at 2068‐69.

15

Debtors’ Joint Chapter 11 Plan, In re: RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, No 09‐B‐30047, Docket

No 205, * §3.09 (Bankr ND Ill June 4, 2010). This profit sharing provision may have been
problematic independent of the credit bidding dispute. The debtor, however, argued that the
buyer’s willingness to share some future profits with junior creditors was not of concern to the
senior creditor as long as no such obligation was imposed on other bidders. Though not raised on
appeal, this backdoor distribution to the junior creditors might violate the “fair and equitable”
requirement. While such “gifting” has become common practice in the wake of sales, it has been
questioned regularly by appellate courts. See, for example, In re DBSD North America, Inc, 634 F3d
79 (2d Cir 2011).
16

See, for example, Brief of Petitioner, RadLAX v Amalgamated Bank, No 11‐166, *9‐10 (S Ct,

Jan 28, 2012) (“Petitioner’s Brief”).
17

5

BFP v Resolution Trust Corp, 511 US 531 (1994).

The senior creditor argued that this understanding of the “fair and
equitable” principle offered it too little protection.18 It was entitled to the entire
hotel unless someone else was willing to put up more than $120 million to buy it.
Hence, it should also have the right to “credit bid,” the right to participate in the
auction without putting up any cash. As the senior creditor, it was entitled to all
the cash that the sale produced. Any cash it gave to the auctioneer would
necessarily be immediately returned to it. Hence, unlike other bidders, it should
be released from having to put up cash.
Forcing the senior creditor to turn over cash that would be immediately
returned serves no purpose other than to place an obstacle in its way. Borrowing
cash, even for a short time, is not costless. Among other things, the senior lender
is often not a single entity, but rather a consortium of investors, some based
overseas. Coordinating actions among them is hard.19 Regulations may limit the
ability of some to contribute new cash, even for a few minutes. The frictions such
coordination difficulties present should not keep the senior creditor from taking
its collateral when it prefers the collateral to the highest cash offer. So ran the
secured creditor’s argument.20
To resolve these competing arguments about whether a plan could provide
for a sale without giving the secured creditor a right to credit bid, the Court in
RadLAX turned to the part of the Bankruptcy Code that spells out what it means
for a plan to be “fair and equitable” with respect to secured creditors.21 This

18

See, for example, Brief for Respondent, RadLAX v Amalgamated Bank, No 11‐166, *19‐20 (S

Ct, March 2, 2012) (“Respondent’s Brief”).
19

See, for example, In re Metaldyne Corp, 09‐13412 (Bankr SDNY 2009) (approving credit bid

at the motion of 97% of the creditors in the consortium to overcome objections of 3% hold out
group).
20

Respondent’s Brief at 20‐21.

21

Section 1129(b)(2)(A) provides:
(i)

that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such claims, whether
the property subject to such liens is retained by the debtor or transferred to
another entity, to the extent of the allowed amount of such claims; and (II) that
each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of such claim deferred
cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim, of a value,

6

provision requires that the plan must provide the secured creditor with (1) a lien
on its collateral and a note equal to the value of its secured claim; (2) a sale
subject to credit bidding; or (3) “for the realization by such holders of the
indubitable equivalent of such claims.”22
This language contains an ambiguity. On the one hand, the provision is
written in the disjunctive. As long as a sale without credit bidding provides the
secured creditor with the “indubitable equivalent” of its claim, a plan is fair and
equitable. Each of the avenues is an alternative to the other.23 The provision that
explicitly provides that a sale with credit bidding is fair and equitable is not
dispositive. It does not exclude the possibility that giving the secured creditor the
proceeds of a sale without credit bidding might also provide the indubitable
equivalent of the secured claim and therefore also be fair and equitable.
Of course, one can take a different view. While each section stands as an
alternative to the others, each sheds light on the other. Because the provision
explicitly provides that a sale with credit bidding is “fair and equitable,” one can
infer that a sale without credit bidding is not “fair and equitable.” It cannot
provide the secured creditor with the “indubitable equivalent” of its claim.

as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holderʹs interest
in the estateʹs interest in such property;
(ii)

for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property that is subject
to the liens securing such claims, free and clear of such liens, with such liens to
attach to the proceeds of such sale, and the treatment of such liens on proceeds
under clause (i) or (iii) of this subparagraph; or

(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent of such claims.
Section 363(k) gives secured creditors a right to credit bid in the absence of cause in those cases in
which assets are sold outside of a reorganization plan.
22

Id.

23

In re Phila Newspapers, LLC, 599 F 3d 298 (3d Cir 2010). The Third Circuit invoked the

familiar cannon of textual interpretation that focuses on the meaning of disjunctive lists
containing the word “or.” Id at 304‐10; see also Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:
The Interpretation of Legal Texts 116‐25 (West 2012) (explaining the “Conjunctive/Disjunctive
Canon”). The Third Circuit based its adoption of this statutory canon in part on 11 USC §102(5),
which provides that “’or’ is not exclusive.”

7

Inferring exclusions of some things because of the inclusion of others is a well‐
recognized part of how ordinary people understand language.24 Called “scalar
implicatures,” linguists have studied them closely for the last fifty years.25
Consider the following two statements.
An apartment building limits the pets tenants may have. It permits
“cats, small dogs, or pets that are apartment friendly.”
Your nephew has asked you for a video game that has “big scary
monsters, robots, or cool stuff.”
Both these examples have the same structure as the provision of the Bankruptcy
Code the Court confronted in RadLAX. There is a mandate and three avenues to
satisfying it. In the first case, the rule identifies the sort of pet that a tenant may
have; the second example identifies the types of video game that your nephew
will like; the Bankruptcy Code identifies the plans that are “fair and equitable.”
In all three cases, there are specifically blessed types (“cats” and “small dogs”;
“big scary monsters” and “robots”; notes secured by liens on the collateral and
sales subject to credit bidding). There is also a general category (“apartment
friendly” pets; “cool stuff”; plans that provide the “indubitable equivalent”).
Each list puts forward two discrete options, and leaves a large category that lacks
a hard definition. What exactly is an apartment friendly pet? What exactly is cool
stuff? What provides the indubitable equivalent?
The linguistic question we face in each case is the extent to which the
meaning of the larger and more general category is informed by the inclusion of
the other more specific ones. Does the reference to small dogs implicitly exclude
large ones and tell us, by implication, that large dogs are not apartment friendly?
Does the reference to big scary monsters exclude small ones, and, by implication,
exclude the possibility that small scary monsters might be cool? Does the

24

The basic ideas are based on the work of Paul Grice. See Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of

Words 22‐40 (Harvard 1989).
25

See generally Ryan Doran, et al, A Novel Experimental Paradigm for Distinguishing Between

What is Said and What is Implicated, 88 Language 1, 124 (2012) (reviewing theoretical and
experimental literature on scalar implicatures).
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reference to sales subject to credit bidding exclude sales that are not, and, again
by implication, exclude the possibility that sales without credit bidding can
provide the indubitable equivalent?
Items on such a list can serve different roles. A specific item on a list might
be understood as a specific illustration or a safe harbor, and not as serving to
exclude others of the same type. The owner of a cat or a small dog is spared the
effort of arguing that a particular cat or a particular small dog is apartment
friendly. Specific items can provide context that enables the rule provider to
understand the more general mandate. The nephew might list a specific type of
video game that is acceptable without any intent that you exclude other games or
draw inferences about what is not cool. Instead, he may have pointed to big
scary monsters to make vivid what sorts of games are cool.26
It is axiomatic among modern linguists that one cannot determine how an
ordinary speaker understands any of these statements merely by resorting to
abstract principle. Instead, one must engage in empirical inquiry. As it happens,
most ordinary native speakers of English think that the apartment building does
not permit large dogs.27 By listing small dogs as among the pets that are

26

In the case of the nephew, another force may be at work. The ability to infer the exclusion

of one thing from the inclusion of another is underdeveloped in young children. See Ira Noveck,
When Children Are More Logical Than Adults: Experimental Investigations of Scalar Implicature, 78
Cognition 165 (2001); Anna Papafragoua and Julien Musolino, Scalar Implicatures: Experiments at
the Semantics–Pragmatics Interface, 86 Cognition 253, 267 (2003). A speaker of English may infer a
young age for the nephew from the way the preferences are spelled out and take this into account
in trying to understand what is being said.
27

We surveyed two thousand individuals using Mechanical Turk and seventy‐four percent

of the native English speakers opted for this interpretation. We ran an alternative survey of two
thousand different individuals using the word “and” in place of “or.” The results were not
meaningfully different: seventy‐seven percent of the native English speakers opted for the
interpretation excluding large dogs. Web‐based surveys, of course, rely on samples that, while
diverse, are not randomly drawn. There are other potential sources of bias as well. Alternative
methodologies, however, are not likely to produce qualitatively different results for questions
such as this. See Adam J. Berinsky, Gregory A. Huber, and Gabriel S. Lenz, Evaluating Online
Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 Political Analysis 351

9

permitted, the speaker is understood to exclude large dogs. The speaker is telling
us both that she judges small dogs to be apartment friendly, and that she has
reached the opposite conclusion for large dogs. The purpose of an open‐ended
category is to allow for certain apartment friendly pets that are neither cats nor
dogs. It is still open whether canaries are apartment friendly, but the issue is
resolved as far as dogs are concerned. Small ones are; large ones are not. In this
example, the use of the adjective small is functioning as a scalar implicature for
the typical native speaker.
Implicatures can be expected to be used in accordance with certain linguistic
maxims.28 For example, the two Gricean maxims of quantity suggest that a
speaker will make his statement 1) as informative as necessary; but 2) no more
so.29 A speaker who includes the word “small” would, under the first maxim, be
expected to include the word “large” if both small and large dogs were allowed.30
The word’s absence violates the first maxim of quantity if large dogs were
allowed. The statement thus implies the exclusion of large dogs. As with other
linguistic maxims, this one was anticipated by one of the standard Latin maxims
of statutory interpretation. In this case, it is expressio unius est exclusio alterius.31
The same analysis could apply to the nephew’s request. But ordinary native
speakers of English believe that the nephew is perfectly open to the possibility
that small scary monsters, like robots and big scary monsters, might be cool.32
The nephew refers to large scary monsters to illustrate what might constitute

(2012); Laura Germine et al., Is the Web as Good as the Lab? Comparable Performance from Web and
Lab in Cognitive/Perceptual Experiments, 19 Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 847 (2012).
28

See generally Grice, Studies the Way of Words (cited in note 24).

29

Id at 26.

30

Of course, just “dogs” would have sufficed as well.

31

The close connection between maxims of statutory interpretation and Gricean maxims has,

of course, been long recognized. See, for example, Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of
Interpretation, 1990 Wis L Rev 1179 (1990).
32

Again we surveyed two thousand individuals using Mechanical Turk and seventy‐six

percent of the native English speakers opted for this interpretation. An an alternative survey of
two thousand different individuals using the phrase “or any other cool stuff” in place of “or cool
stuff” did not produce meaningfully different results (seventy‐four percent).
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cool stuff, not to create an excluded category of scary monster. This is consistent
with an application of Grice’s second maxim of quantity. The parallel maxim of
statutory interpretation at work here is eiusdem generis. The specific examples (big
scary monsters and robots) illuminate the large category (“cool stuff”). “Cool
stuff” has to be like big scary monsters or robots in some way, but it does not
have to be big scary monsters or robots.
Linguistic theory alone is still too primitive to explain when ordinary
speakers will draw different inferences from statements that have the same
grammatical structure. Much ink continues to be spilled over words such as
“some” and “or.” Linguists are not yet able to explain the difference between
using the word “big” in asking for a video game with “big scary monsters” and
using the word “small” in permitting tenants to have “small dogs” as pets. The
best one can do is to observe that ordinary listeners understand these statements
differently.
The understanding of ordinary speakers can change with only small changes
in context. Even when we limit ourselves to an apartment’s pet policy, different
items on the same list can serve different functions. If goldfish is added to the list
of permitted pets, ordinary speakers are not inclined to think that all other types
of fish are excluded. They might think that goldfish are on the list not to exclude
other types of fish, but rather to provide an example with which others might be
compared.33 There is more room to argue that tropical fish are permitted than
there is room to argue that large dogs are apartment friendly.
This is simply to say that linguistic maxims, like their counterparts in
statutory interpretation, can be helpful in identifying the dynamics at work, but
they are less useful in pinning down the meaning of a specific statement. In
understanding whether a particular adjective (small, gold, or big) implicitly
excludes the others (large, tropical, or small) that are within the larger category
(of dogs, fish, or scary monsters), context matters. Ordinary speakers may be
familiar with apartments that have weight limits on dogs. They may also have

33

In our surveys a majority of the native English speakers opted for this interpretation (sixty

percent in one survey and sixty‐nine percent in the other).

11

listened enough to young children to know that they are not as attuned to the
way that the use of adjectives may implicitly exclude what is not described. They
may also think that young children make their illustrations vivid (“big scary
monster”), to convey what constitutes “cool stuff.”
All that being said, even context leaves matters unclear. The inference that
the majority of native speakers of English draws will not be universal. One in
four native English speakers thinks that the apartment permits large dogs if
apartment friendly. For this minority, if someone wants to prohibit large dogs,
their rules should not have open‐ended categories. Exclusions should be explicit.
Similarly, one in four speakers of English understands the nephew to exclude
small scary monsters. He wants a video game with big scary monsters because
these are the only sorts of monsters that are cool.
Even if linguistics were more advanced, one can progress only so far in
interpreting a statute by relying on the understanding of native speakers.
Legislation is not understood in the same fashion as ordinary language. The way
statutes are drafted is so radically different from the way language is typically
used that one has to be careful about focusing on the common understanding.
The balance between clarity and redundancy is likely to be struck differently.
Less may be left to implication, and ambiguity may arise for altogether different
reasons.
Statutes are written in a special language and often with special care.
Sometimes this makes the task of statutory interpretation easier. The drafters of
the Bankruptcy Code, for example, created a concordance and ensured that when
the same words and phrases were used in different places in the text, they had
the same meaning. But precisely because they are trying to be clear, drafters may
leave less to implication. Inferences that might be reasonable with respect to
regular speech might not make sense with respect to legislation.34
34

Grice’s maxims, for example, emphasize concision. An ordinary speaker avoids

redundancy. As a result, listeners draw inferences in order to give each word meaning. Grice,
Studies the Way of Words (cited in note 24). The drafter of a statute does not value and does not
expect her listeners to value concision, at least not in the same way. Hence, inferences one would
ordinarily draw make less sense.

12

At the same time, statutes contain language that is ambiguous in ways that
ordinary speech is not. Drafting of legislation reflects the product of competing
interests. Accommodating these may itself result in ambiguities that arise not by
virtue of carelessness, but because each competing interest finds itself better off
living with the ambiguity (and with its belief about how such ambiguity will be
resolved) than continuing to struggle over text.35
As it happens, the difficulties we face in interpreting the section of the
Bankruptcy Code at the center of RadLAX arise for just this reason. The provision
itself reflects a compromise between those who favored credit bidding in all
cases and those who did not. The provision was drafted in the mid‐1970s in the
shadow of a recent real estate bankruptcy case. A group of investors put up a
modest amount of capital, formed a limited partnership, and had it borrow $1.45
million from an insurance company to build Pine Gate, an apartment complex
outside of Atlanta. The lender agreed to look only to this real property in the
event of default.36
After a short time the investors filed a bankruptcy petition.37 The bankruptcy
judge estimated the value of the property and confirmed a plan of reorganization
in which the insurance company was given a note that the bankruptcy judge
found was worth the value of the property.

35

On the sources of legislative ambiguity, see Saul Levmore, Ambiguous Statutes, 77 U Chi L

Rev 1073 (2009).
36

See In re Pine Gate Assocs, Ltd, No B75‐4345A, 1976 US Dist LEXIS 17366 (ND Ga Oct 14,

1976); In re Pine Gate Assocs, Ltd, 12 Collier Bankr Cas (MB) 607 (Bankr ND Ga Mar 4, 1977); see
also Douglas G. Baird, Remembering Pine Gate, 38 John Marshall L Rev 5 (2004).
37

Pine Gate turned out to be too far from Atlanta to attract the tenants willing to pay the rent

the investors expected. Indeed, it attracted few renters of any kind. The property was not going to
do well until there was more development in the area, and it became clear this would not happen
for a long time. The property was no longer worth what the insurance company was owed.
Moreover, if the insurance company foreclosed, the investors would be saddled with enormous
tax liabilities. They took advantage of accelerated depreciation rules so that their basis in the
property was much lower than its foreclosure value. Baird, 38 John Marshall L Rev at 7 (cited in
note 36).

13

The plan, in his view, was “fair and equitable.” The empirical evidence
suggests that bankruptcy judges provide unbiased valuations of assets, but these
valuations are subject to wide variance and this variance alone may give the
debtor an ability to capture value.38 The debtor does not have to go forward with
any particular plan before it learns the judge’s valuation. If the judge provides a
value that is too high, the debtor could walk away from the property. By
contrast, if the judge announces a value that is too low, the investors could put in
place a plan of reorganization and then flip the property, paying the senior
creditor the artificially low amount set by the bankruptcy judge and pocketing
the difference.
Guarding against this sort of strategic behavior on the part of the debtor is
one of the things that a bankruptcy judge must do in trying to craft rules that
vindicate the “fair and equitable” requirement. Bankruptcy lawyers and judges
are aware of the Pine Gate problem and indeed know it by that name. One can
argue that such cases provide a reason to entrust these issues to the bankruptcy
court in the first place. Like much else in bankruptcy practice, the Pine Gate
problem is not especially visible to outsiders. The case itself cannot be found in
any of the standard reporters, nor is it in Westlaw; but bankruptcy judges and
lawyers know it, worry about it, and talk about it.
The drafters of the Bankruptcy Code trusted the ability of bankruptcy judges
to implement the fair and equitable rule through case‐by‐case development. The
drafters, however, had to contend with representatives of real estate lenders who
had the ear of some of the legislators and who took a different lesson from Pine
Gate. For them, Pine Gate showed a downside to giving bankruptcy judges
discretion over too broad a domain. In the course of vindicating other goals,
bankruptcy judges will slight the fair and equitable requirement, even while
giving lip service to it. These representatives wanted to corral the scope of
bankruptcy judges’ discretion and limit their ability to develop the “fair and
equitable” rule.39
38

See Douglas G. Baird, and Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and

the Reorganization Bargain, 115 Yale L J 1930 (2006).
39

See generally Baird, 38 John Marshall L Rev 5 (cited in note 36).
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The compromise that emerged is the Bankruptcy Code’s elaboration of fair
and equitable with its two specific provisions—notes supported by liens and
sales subject to credit bidding—and one general one—providing the indubitable
equivalent. The drafters consciously left tension between them unresolved.40 In
other words, the legislative compromise itself introduced the ambiguity. We face
a difficulty that does not arise when one person attempts to convey meaning to
another.
The kind of ambiguity that emerges in these environments depends on what
background rule of interpretation the contending interests think the courts will
ultimately adopt. To put the point somewhat more formally, a compromise such
as the one here is a Bayesian equilibrium in which neither party to the
negotiations thinks it can improve its position given the position of the other and
given its beliefs about how a court will interpret the ambiguity. The method that
resolves the ambiguity, or at least beliefs about this method, is part of the
background against which the statute is drafted in the first place.41
That the drafters themselves understood they were leaving matters
ambiguous should caution against thinking that the text itself provides a clear

40

Complex statutes passed many decades ago are usually the work of many forgotten

hands. Hence, most discussions of what the drafters believed they were doing are abstract and
somewhat artificial. Whether an ambiguity was deliberate is a matter for speculation. Not so with
bankruptcy. Its world is small, and everyone in it knows the two individuals who drafted the
Bankruptcy Code. It is easy enough to ask one of them about such things, and we have. This is
not to say, of course, that the drafters’ awareness of the ambiguity should itself have any affect on
how the language is interpreted.
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Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 Geo LJ 715 (1992). The compromises that
force courts to confront statutory ambiguity arise in many environments. See, for example, United
States v Taylor, 487 US 326 (1988) (Speedy Trial Act); Board of Educ v Mergens, 496 US 226 (1990)
(interpreting provisions of Equal Access Act, statute forbidding discrimination against religion‐
based student groups). For a general discussion of the problem, see Courtney Simmons,
Unmasking The Rhetoric of Purpose: The Supreme Court and Legislative Compromise, 44 Emory LJ 117
(1995).
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answer.42 Instead of adopting an interpretative rule that tries to resolve the
meaning of the text, it may make more sense to adopt an interpretative rule that
vindicates other objectives and assume that, over time, those who bargain over
legislative language will negotiate with this rule in mind. RadLAX and the
sequence of cases leading up to it may be understood as an effort to articulate
such a background rule. We explore the rule that seems to be emerging and trace
its origins in the next part.
II. Bankruptcy’s Domain
In confronting the ambiguity in RadLAX, the Court could have leaned
towards expanding the scope of the bankruptcy judge’s discretion. One can
argue that, in the absence of an unambiguous statute, much is sensibly left to
case‐by‐case adjudication. Reviewing courts have little expertise with respect to
reorganizing large corporations. Congress may have intended for bankruptcy
judges to enjoy considerable discretion when it provided a general directive that
plans be “fair and equitable” and allowed them to confirm plans of
reorganization without staying them pending review by an Article III court.
Credit bidding is, from this perspective, one of the many issues facing
bankruptcy judges who supervise corporate reorganizations. It is their job to
assess the value of credit bidding and weigh it against the competing objectives
of the Bankruptcy Code. Although there may not be many situations in which
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ambiguity provides interpretative challenges in other contexts as well. Contract cases are full of
examples where the parties have intentionally left it to a later court to determine the precise
meaning of a provision. The interpretative role of courts in those cases is quite different from
interpreting intentional ambiguity in a statute. See, for example, Omri Ben‐Shahar, Agreeing to
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restrictions on credit bidding make sense,43 it is possible to imagine a narrow set
of cases where obstacles to a secured creditor’s bid are valuable because that
creditor’s participation in an auction might scare away other less informed
bidders—even those who might place a higher value on the property.44 Judges
sensibly developing jurisprudence around the idea of “fair and equitable” should
be attuned to such issues.45 The Supreme Court, however, hardly looked at the
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RadLAX that these situations were indeed so rare that a plan that prohibits credit bidding cannot
be “fair and equitable.” In making this argument, however, they focused on how credit bidding
vindicated the absolute priority rule, not on general principles of statutory interpretation. Amicus
Brief, RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v Amalgamated Bank, No 11‐166 (S Ct March 8, 2012).
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junior creditors would suffer part of the cost. This effect matters only when the asset’s true value
hovers close above the face value of the senior lien. The ability of the senior creditor to credit bid
costlessly may aggravate the problem of the “winner’s curse,” the idea that a bidder who wins an
auction has overpaid for the asset because she was willing to pay more than the market for the
asset. This effect is magnified when one of the bidders has asymmetric information—all the
worse to pay more than the amount that the party who knows the true value is willing to pay.
The equilibrium is often that the other bidders anticipate this and therefore make no bid. This in
turn pushes down the price the informed bidder pays. Paul Klemperer, The Wallet Game and its
Applications, 42 Eur Econ Rev 757 (1998) (noting that a very small information advantage can
greatly increase a bidder’s chance of winning and “greatly reduce the price he pays”); Paul
Klemperer, What Really Matters in Auction Design, 16 J Econ Persp 169, 173 (describing how
asymmetric information can depress auction bids as bidders attempt to avoid the “winner’s
curse”).
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are not focused on the merits of this argument. We do not want to overstate the argument for
limitations on credit bidding. Among other things, limiting credit bidding is a particularly
ineffective and crude way of eliminating the potential winner’s curse (assuming the problem is
real to begin with). Auction theorists have suggested more direct ways of designing non‐
ascending auctions to deal with this situation. But very little work has been done to apply those
design theories to bankruptcy. One notable exception is Paul Povel and Rajdeep Singh, Sale‐Backs
in Bankruptcy, 23 J L Econ & Org 710 (2007) (discussing ways to bias auctions against
informationally advantaged bidders to increase the expected final bid). Povel and Singh note that
while it may be optimal to exclude the informationally advantaged bidders in ascending
auctions, it is “optimal to always let [them] participate” when the sale procedures can be freely
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merits of credit bidding at all. To understand the course it took, it is necessary to
step back from the narrow question of statutory interpretation and connect it to
the Court’s other bankruptcy opinions.
RadLAX is part of a family of cases in which the Court has limited the
domain over which the bankruptcy judge may exercise her discretion. The most
prominent of these is the sequence of cases beginning with Northern Pipeline
Construction Co v Marathon Pipeline Co46 and Granfinanciera SA v Nordberg47 that
continued with Stern v Marshall in 2011.48 Those cases dealt directly with the fact
that bankruptcy judges are not Article III judges and do not possess judicial
power. As a result, they can issue final judgments only with respect to matters
that are central to the administration of the bankruptcy process. RadLAX—and
other cases not usually included in the Marathon‐to‐Stern list—embrace an
analogous principle.
RadLAX provides a gloss on how the Court understands Congress to have
exercised its bankruptcy power. Principles like “indubitable equivalent” allow
for “unruly”49 exercises of discretion. Hence, Congress intended that the
boundaries within which such discretion is available should be narrow—
particularly when the results of that discretion are unreviewable as a practical
matter. The confirmation of a plan puts in place a sequence of events that is hard
to reverse. Assets have been sold and new securities have been issued. The senior
creditor no longer has a right to protest because the dispute is “equitably moot.”
The amount of free rein the bankruptcy judge enjoys must be seen in this light.
Between two interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code that are otherwise
plausible, the one to be preferred, at least when nonbankruptcy rights are in

designed. Id at 712. Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code requires ascending auctions or prohibits free
auction design. See, for example, In re Texas Rangers Baseball Ptnrs, 431 BR 707, 710 (Bankr ND Tx
2010) (noting the court’s clear power to “author and adopt bidding procedures”).
46
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issue, is the one that limits the power of the bankruptcy judge to depart from
objective benchmarks such as those that the market provides. This idea has long
been an undercurrent in the Court’s bankruptcy jurisprudence. Indeed, it is
fundamental to the evolution of the “fair and equitable” doctrine itself.
The Supreme Court’s first clean take on the meaning of “fair and equitable”
came in Case v Los Angeles Lumber Products.50 The Court treated these words as
terms of art that meant absolute priority. The relevant precedent did not compel
this understanding of the language. The Court could have picked instead an
interpretation that gave bankruptcy judges greater freedom to decide whether a
particular plan of reorganization could be confirmed. By choosing the absolute‐
priority meaning, the Court significantly limited the scope of discretion available
to the lower courts in reorganization cases.
The Court’s answers to other questions about the meaning of “fair and
equitable” follow in the same spirit. In spelling out the “fair and equitable” test
as it applies to unsecured creditors, the Bankruptcy Code prohibits junior interest
holders from receiving any property on account of their existing claim or interest
when those senior to them are not paid in full.51 On its face, this provision adds
little. If the firm owes the senior lender $200, and the firm is worth $100, there is
no way to give anything to the junior stakeholders and comply with the absolute
priority rule. When they are not being paid in full, the seniors are entitled to
everything.
The old junior stakeholders, however, sometimes offer to make a new
contribution to the firm. They insist that they are not receiving anything on
account of their old interest. They are receiving a share of the reorganized firm
on account of the new value they are putting in. In principle, acquiring an
interest in the firm in return for such contributions does not violate absolute
priority. The question, however, is whether the bankruptcy judge can even
entertain such an argument. In Los Angeles Lumber, the Court suggested in
dictum that, when senior stakeholders were not paid in full, participation by the
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11 USC §1129(b)(2)(B).
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junior stakeholders required new value from them in “money or money’s
worth.”52 Sweat equity was not good enough—regardless of the value a
bankruptcy court might place it.
When the Court confronted this question again in 203 N LaSalle,53 it found
that giving the old stakeholders any kind of exclusive right to a share of the
reorganized business, even in return for cash, was suspect. It was not permissible
for the bankruptcy judge to rely on experts to determine that the old
stakeholders were paying enough. The junior stakeholders could participate, but
only if their contribution was market tested. It was not enough that the
bankruptcy judge found it sufficient. The key issue was not the substantive right
of the junior stakeholders, but whether the bankruptcy judge had been delegated
the power to decide whether the junior stakeholders were entitled to exercise it
and what it is worth.54
RadLAX follows in the same spirit. The substantive right of the senior
creditors was not open to doubt. Because the assets were worth less than they
were owed, they were entitled to whatever value the assets had. No one argued
otherwise. The question rather was whether the bankruptcy judges had been
delegated the power to choose the form in which senior creditors were given that
value. Like her determination that a junior stakeholder is providing new value,
the bankruptcy judge’s determination that the senior creditor is receiving the
“indubitable equivalent” is essentially unreviewable. The Court limited the
impact of this unreviewable discretion to confirm a plan of reorganization by
holding that it did not include plans that provided for sales without credit
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308 US at 122.
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interfere with substantive rights or about using the market as a solution. Peter Leeson notes that
even eighteenth century pirates recognized this problem and applied a similar solution. Peter
Leeson, An‐arrgh‐chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization, 115 J Pol 1049, 1073 (2007).
(Noting that the elected quartermaster would auction off items with uncertain value to prevent
conflict and “constrain[] the discretion of the quartermaster, who might otherwise be in a
position to circumvent the terms of compensation”).
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bidding. In the face of an ambiguous statute, the court opted for the reading that
narrowed the options of the bankruptcy judge to reshape nonbankruptcy rights.
Limiting the domain of the bankruptcy judge’s decision protects
nonbankruptcy rights from dilution. We can see this at work in In re River East,55
a case decided while RadLAX was before the Court. The issue in that case can be
put simply. Debtor owes Bank $100 and owns Blackacre, which the bankruptcy
court finds is worth $50. Bank demands it be given a lien on Blackacre for $100
and a note that has a discounted present value of $50. Debtor proposes a plan
that it claims provides Bank with the “indubitable equivalent” of its claim. It
offers to give Bank a stream of payments backed by a treasury bill that is worth
$50. There is no doubt that the stream of payments that Bank is being offered is
in fact worth the value of its secured claim as measured by the bankruptcy judge.
Unlike the note secured by the building, the note secured by the treasury bills
has a readily ascertainable market value and this value is $50. Hence, the debtor
argues, the secured creditor is getting the indubitable equivalent of a $50 claim.56
Confirming such a plan, however, runs contrary to the spirit of RadLAX and
the cases leading up to it. A plan that gives Bank a lien on Blackacre for the
amount of its claim gives it a chance to capture upside in the event that the
property proves to be worth more than the bankruptcy judge decides it is worth.
The ability to enjoy liens provides a cushion against undervaluation—as does the
ability to credit bid. We cannot be confident that a bankruptcy judge will guard
against the problem of valuation variance in assessing “indubitable equivalence.”
Hence, we want to limit the range of circumstances in which the debtor can
satisfy the “fair and equitable” requirement using this test.
Nothing in the provision setting out what it means for a plan to be “fair and
equitable” explicitly bars the debtor from proposing a plan in which the secured
lender receives only equity in the reorganized business, but those who do not
trust the judge’s discretion will resist readings of the Bankruptcy Code that allow
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such license.57 When the secured creditor is provided with senior secured debt
under a plan, it is more likely to be paid the true value of what it is owed even
when the bankruptcy judge misvalues the underlying assets.
Together these cases start to form a pattern. On certain questions, the market
and Congress are the only competent arbiters. To the extent Congress is unclear
in addressing those questions, the Court will view it as providing as narrow a
rule as is reasonably consistent with the Code’s language.
This presumption arises not from ordinary understanding or some general
interpretative canon, but rather from an interpretative principle indigenous to
bankruptcy. From this view, bankruptcy policy is best vindicated when, even
with respect to the business properly entrusted to them, bankruptcy judges are
limited in their freedom to make factual decisions that may impact
nonbankruptcy entitlements. It is for this reason, and not the understanding of
the ordinary speaker, that a sale subject to credit bidding is more like a small dog
than a big scary monster.
III. Bankruptcy through a Chevron Lens
In bankruptcy, the threshold question is similar but covers a different type of
power than the one at issue in administrative law. In the case of an
administrative agency, there is a threshold inquiry about the extent to which
Congress has effectively delegated lawmaking power to the agency in the first
place.58 That is to say, the “step‐zero” questions of administrative law is about
which legal decisions fall under the agency power.59 The answer determines
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scope of delegation. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 Okla L
Rev 1, 4‐5 (2004) (lamenting the tendency of the Court and scholars to conflate the scope of
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when courts will defer to an agency. 60 In the case of bankruptcy, on the other
hand, the threshold question concerns not the delegation of law making but the
delegation of discretion to the bankruptcy judge to apply legal principles to the
facts before her. Here the Court has consistently found that, when the underlying
statutory language is unclear, there should be a presumption in favor of
interpretations that limit the extent to which the bankruptcy judge can exercise
her discretion where it may impact nonbankruptcy rights.61
The different issues at stake caution against pressing the analogy between
bankruptcy and administrative law too far. Nevertheless, many of the factors
that incline the Court to think an agency should be entrusted with an
interpretation of a statute seem to suggest a posture towards interpreting the
Bankruptcy Code that is different. Instead, bankruptcy judges, when the statute
is ambiguous, should be able to apply a general standard to a given set of facts. A
bankruptcy court makes its decision by formal adjudications62 with the force of

level of deference is set in large part by the unreviewable nature of the decisions. But the question
of the scope of delegation is the one that was before the court in RadLAX, and the question of
interest to us.
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(cited in note 58). Justice Breyer has advocated a case‐by‐case inquiry looking at what “a sensible
legislator would have expected given the statutory circumstances.” Id. Justice Scalia has
advocated an across‐the‐board presumption of delegation. Under this view Congress is
presumed to have delegated authority any time it creates ambiguities. Put another way, for
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considerable (though not absolute) traction in the trilogy of step‐zero cases of Christensen, Mead
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into the inquiry for subsequent steps. See Christiansen v Harris County, 529 US 576 (2000)
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law.63 Moreover, the arguments about flexibility, expertise, and institutional
competence that have been put forward to support the delegation of authority to
administrative agencies apply similarly to bankruptcy courts.64 The bankruptcy
court possesses an expertise in administering the Bankruptcy Code, and that
administration—especially when it turns on the facts of a particular case—is
highly complex and not particularly amenable to inflexible rules. Case‐by‐case
adjudication allows for the natural evolution of sound practices, practices that
may not be particularly amenable to top‐down directives.65
It is in part the accountability of agencies—because they are appointed by an
elected branch—that justifies giving them room to maneuver,66 and bankruptcy

“overwhelming number” of cases applying Chevron deference dealt with “the fruits of notice‐
and‐comment rulemaking or formal adjudication”).
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statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”) Of course,
some rulings of the bankruptcy court no longer have the force of law after Stern and Marathon.
But matters not excluded by those cases are still understood to be decided with the force of law.
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courts are among the least politically accountable entities. They are neither
elected, nor appointed by an elected branch. But accountability is a much less
weighty factor when the discretion is being exercised over factual findings than
over legal interpretations. Legal interpretations are a form of law making.67 That
is traditionally a function of elected government. Factual determinations are not.
The explanation for the Court’s reluctance to find that Congress entrusted
bankruptcy courts to apply broad standards to the facts before her may lie in the
way that RadLAX is connected to other parts of the Court’s bankruptcy
jurisprudence. Butner stands for the idea that nonbankruptcy rights create a
baseline. The law of corporate reorganizations is designed to help investors solve
the collective‐action problem they face when their firm encounters financial
distress. Bankruptcy provides a forum in which they can sort out conflicting
claims when the assets are insufficient to pay everyone off in full. Nothing in this
policy requires altering the priority that one creditor enjoys over another outside
of bankruptcy.68
Once one accepts this principle, it is only a short step to assume that
Congress is similarly reluctant to expand the discretion that bankruptcy courts
enjoy. Discretion with respect to questions such as the value of a nonbankruptcy
entitlement can result in this entitlement being slighted. As 203 N. LaSalle
suggests, when markets are available to assess the value of nonbankruptcy
entitlements, there is no need for a bankruptcy judge to do so.
The need to guard the nonbankruptcy rights closely might seem to lead to
limiting the power of bankruptcy judges to reshape them. But it is not a
necessary response. Adherence to Butner might not require limiting the power of
bankruptcy judges. Taking Butner seriously only means that whoever is
entrusted with the power to affect the nonbankruptcy rights of parties should be
well aware of and respect that principle. Indeed, there is no reason to think
bankruptcy judges will systematically slight nonbankruptcy rights or that rules
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are needed to rein them in. Not only are bankruptcy courts likely to be aware of
the importance of the Butner principle, they are likely to have a comparative
advantage (over Congress and Article III courts) in identifying which factual
issues and decisions are prone to raise Butner concerns and go astray of
nonbankruptcy rights. For what its worth, the bankruptcy courts in RadLAX and
Philadelphia Newspapers found that plans that denied senior creditors the ability to
credit bid were not fair and equitable. It was the circuit judges who were
divided.69 Similarly, the bankruptcy judge in River East limited the breadth of
plans allowed as indubitably equivalent to protect the value of nonbankruptcy
rights.70 Moreover, limiting the power of the bankruptcy court in these cases will
not protect the nonbankruptcy rights in all cases. In particular factual scenarios,
the bankruptcy court’s discretion might be exercised precisely to protect the
nonbankruptcy rights where the narrow rule‐like reading is sometimes
underprotective.71
Of perhaps even greater importance is the posture that the Court has taken
to the constitutional problems inherent in delegating so much power to non‐
Article III judges. While one can trace some of the limits on judicial discretion in
bankruptcy to an era in which judges in reorganization cases were Article III
judges, today a large part of the rationale derives from the fact that bankruptcy
judges are not Article III judges and that their decisions are hard to review.
Indeed, in Stern the majority squarely rejected the dissent’s argument that the
implicit control that the judiciary has over bankruptcy courts by means of
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appointment, oversight, and appellate review somehow alleviates balance‐of‐
power structural concerns.
Congress has the power to create substantive bankruptcy provisions that
may alter state law rights, but any grant of discretion that allows the bankruptcy
court to apply a general directive to achieve that same outcome begins to look
like a traditional adjudication of private rights at common law. And those
adjudications are the special province of Article III judges. Precisely because
bankruptcy law is, by its nature, both vindicating and altering nonbankruptcy
(often state law) rights, the Court worries more about those nonbankruptcy
rights. The more Congress entrusts discretion of any kind to bankruptcy judges
or anyone else who lacks the attributes that Article III requires, the more
constitutionally questionable the system becomes.
Put simply, Congress can alter nonbankruptcy rights but the bankruptcy
judge cannot. The less rule‐like the bankruptcy law, the greater the danger that
the bankruptcy judge will be shaping bankruptcy policy rather than applying the
one Congress has created. Moreover, the more one relies on the discretion of the
bankruptcy judge, the more likely the bankruptcy judge will be adjudicating
nonbankruptcy rights, a function exclusive to Article III judges. RadLAX puts in
place an avoidance presumption that reads ambiguities in the Bankruptcy Code
in a way that limits the ability of the bankruptcy judge either to alter
nonbankruptcy rights or adjudicate them.
Unlike most areas of federal law, bankruptcy law has as its guiding principle
the vindication of rights that exist independent of itself. It is one thing to allow a
non‐Article III tribunal to alter state law rights to achieve a uniform federal
environmental policy; but quite another to allow it to alter those rights in the
name of a statute that has the vindication of those very rights as one of its
foundational principles. If Congress intends to change that nonbankruptcy law,
it does so explicitly; if it intends to point to that law as a guide for application,
interpretation or gap filling, an Article III court may be required to adjudicate the
matter.
This understanding of bankruptcy law embedded in Butner and Marathon
naturally leads to RadLAX. If Congress wants a bankruptcy judge to vindicate
some bankruptcy policy (and thus risk undermining Butner or running afoul of
27

Marathon), it should speak clearly. If Congress wants debtors to be able to pay
creditors in exotic coin that is hard to value, it must say so. If it wants to allow
sales without credit bidding, it must be clear. Congress must be explicit if it
wants to give bankruptcy judges the power to make subjective judgments
(valuations, approval of sale procedures, approval of the form of payment) about
what is “fair and equitable.”
RadLAX is unlikely to have much direct impact on the way that bankruptcy
judges apply the absolute priority rule. There are few cases where limits on
credit bidding make sense.72 In the vast majority of cases, the effect of limits on
credit bidding is to deny the secured creditor some of the value of its claim.
Hence, a plan without credit bidding will rarely offer secured creditors the
indubitable equivalent of their claim, and today’s bankruptcy judges would be
most unlikely to approve such plans. To limit the bankruptcy judge’s discretion
in these cases is to mandate the result they almost always reach anyway. But
RadLAX matters because the presumption it brings to interpreting the
Bankruptcy Code is at work whenever deferring to the bankruptcy court’s
discretion might compromise the principles at work in Butner and Marathon.
In this way, the arc from Los Angeles Lumber to 203 N. LaSalle to RadLAX and
its relationship to Butner and Stern give some meaning and direction to the
Supreme Court’s repeated admonition to adhere strictly to the text of the
Bankruptcy Code. The opinion should not be understood as a general mandate
to apply strong maxims of statutory interpretation to the Bankruptcy Code. Nor
should it be read as an instruction to be narrow across all ambiguities, but rather
only where those ambiguities intersect with the application of nonbankruptcy
rights.
The importance of understanding that RadLAX is not a general mandate for
mechanical application of the canons of interpretation can be seen in two
examples. Courts have struggled with the appropriate treatment of executory
contracts for intellectual property rights in bankruptcy. A provision of the
Bankruptcy Code provides for special protections for holders of copyrights and
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patents, but not for trademarks. Contested is whether the treatment of
trademarks is different when the more general provisions of the Code are
applied.
If RadLAX were read simply as giving a thumb on the scale in favor of the
interpretative canon of expressio unius, then it would suggest that, by giving
special protection to patent and copyright, Congress has determined that patent
and copyright deserved this sort of protection and trademarks did not. If
Congress had wanted this protection for trademarks, they could have easily
provided it. Hence, one should incline away from an interpretation of general
principles to reach the same result. This approach seems wrong across several
dimensions. The question about the consequences that flow from the rejection of
an executory contract in bankruptcy has nothing to do with the domain of the
bankruptcy judge’s discretion over nonbankruptcy rights. Indeed, inferring that
the debtor enjoys a greater power to reject trademark licenses than patent
licenses expands the domain of bankruptcy and runs counter to the Butner
principle.73
Another example can be found in a question that has divided a number of
courts.74 In drafting a series of amendments to the Bankruptcy Code in 2005,
Congress enacted a number of provisions that had the effect of ensuring that
individuals received comparable treatment regardless of which chapter of the
Bankruptcy Code they filed under. Under the most literal reading, however, the
various sections in combination appear to abolish the absolute priority rule in
individual Chapter 11 cases. Apart from unmoored literalism, however, this
reading of the Bankruptcy Code has little to recommend it. Nothing about
RadLAX, however, pushes in favor of such a reading. The amount of discretion
delegated to bankruptcy judges is not implicated. None of the concerns about
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bringing order to the unruly world of bankruptcy push towards excluding
ordinary prepetition assets from the bankruptcy estate.
More importantly, the substantive presumption of RadLAX is not a blanket
presumption of narrowness. When viewed in connection with Butner and
Marathon, the RadLAX presumption is about limiting discretion where its exercise
may alter nonbankruptcy rights. If the ambiguity in the statute does not involve
altering nonbankruptcy rights or exercising anything akin to the judicial power
with respect to nonbankruptcy rights, there is no reason to gravitate towards the
narrow interpretation. Neither Butner nor Marathon is implicated.
As noted above much of the Bankruptcy Code does involve the adjudication
of nonbankruptcy rights, but that is not uniformly true. Some provisions are pure
bankruptcy law. When Congress has left ambiguity over these provisions and
where the bankruptcy court’s discretion impacts only the federal rights created
by the Bankruptcy Code, courts must look elsewhere for interpretative guidance.
For example, when courts are interpreting the boundaries of voidable
preferences and good‐faith filing requirements, they should recall that each is a
statutory matter that exists only as a function of bankruptcy law and
independently of nonbankruptcy rights. Voidable preferences exist only in
bankruptcy and protect the integrity of the collective proceeding.75 Similarly, the
application of discretionary principles such as good faith filing can only be
answered by resort to bankruptcy law principles.76
Ambiguities in these provisions do not implicate the RadLAX presumption.
A question of how broadly a court can define a voidable preference should be
viewed with the policy of bankruptcy in mind rather than some imported state
law directive.77 The same is true for ambiguities that may exist as to the breadth
of anti‐ipso‐facto‐clause provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. These are not
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provisions intended to vindicate nonbankruptcy rights but rather to further
specific bankruptcy principles and bring coherence to the Code. 78 In none of
these cases is there a question of the interpretation, adjudication or discretionary
application of nonbankruptcy rights.79
Conclusion
While Stern makes it clear that bankruptcy courts are not Article III courts,
RadLAX adds the message that they are also not administrative agencies or
anything like them.80 The former narrows the range of legal issues that they may
decide; the latter limits the domain of factual discretion they may exercise in
deciding those issues.
RadLAX crystalizes a substantive interpretive principle that has been in the
background of the Court’s bankruptcy jurisprudence for decades: in interpreting
the Bankruptcy Code, courts should start with the presumption that the range of
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discretion a bankruptcy judge enjoys over issues that affect the application of
substantive nonbankruptcy rights is narrow. Between two interpretations of the
Bankruptcy Code that are otherwise plausible, the Court will incline towards the
one that limits the power of the bankruptcy judge to unsettle those rights.
From the perspective of those deeply immersed in bankruptcy, the Court’s
opinion in RadLAX is unsettling. It embraces an approach to bankruptcy that,
quite apart from its logical coherence, is divorced from reality. Someone reading
the Court’s bankruptcy opinions over the last three decades would have no idea
of the extent to which the world it is trying to regulate has changed.
The bankruptcy world the Court confronted in Marathon was dysfunctional.
The judges were former bankruptcy referees, sometimes corrupt and often of
limited competence. Debtors ran roughshod over the rights of creditors, and
firms often entered Chapter 11 only to bleed to death slowly. The bankruptcy
world today is altogether different. Its judges are among the best in the federal
judiciary. Bankruptcy judges as a general matter quickly dispose of cases that do
not belong in Chapter 11. In large business cases, the judges are typically the
equal of any Delaware Chancellor. They oversee the restructuring of multi‐
billion dollar corporations with consummate skill. As a matter of sound judicial
administration, it would make sense to give them more discretion rather than
less.
Those who work on the ground view the bankruptcy court as creating an
umbrella that protects a space within which interested parties can plot a future
course for a distressed business. The process is necessarily a fluid one and works
best with a decent measure of flexibility and pragmatism. There is no recognition
of this state of affairs in RadLAX or indeed in any of the Court’s bankruptcy
opinions. The pragmatic imperatives at work when the court assesses tribunals
for everything from workers’ compensation to securities trading are altogether
absent when it comes to bankruptcy. One can, of course, take the view that, when
it comes to interpreting the Constitution or a bankruptcy law passed in 1978,
today’s realities are irrelevant. Nevertheless, the failure to recognize these
realities is in the end the most striking difference when viewing bankruptcy
through an administrative law lens.
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